Pathology as a Phenomenological Tool by Carel, Havi
                          Carel, H. (2021). Pathology as a Phenomenological Tool. Continental
Philosophy Review, 54(2), 201-217. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11007-
021-09538-9
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
License (if available):
CC BY
Link to published version (if available):
10.1007/s11007-021-09538-9
Link to publication record in Explore Bristol Research
PDF-document
This is the final published version of the article (version of record). It first appeared online via Springer at
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11007-021-09538-9 . Please refer to any applicable terms of use of
the publisher.
University of Bristol - Explore Bristol Research
General rights
This document is made available in accordance with publisher policies. Please cite only the








Accepted: 13 February 2021 
© The Author(s) 2021
Abstract
The phenomenological method (or rather, methods) has been fruitfully used to study 
the experience of illness in recent years. However, the role of illness is not merely 
that of a passive object for phenomenological scrutiny. I propose that illness, and 
pathology more generally, can be developed into a phenomenological method in 
their own right. I claim that studying cases of pathology, breakdown, and illness 
offer illumination not only of these experiences, but also of normal function and the 
tacit background that underpins it. In particular, I claim that the study of embodi-
ment can be greatly enhanced, and indeed would be incomplete, without attending to 
bodily breakdown and what I term bodily doubt. I offer an analogy between illness 
and Husserl’s epoché, suggesting that both are a source of distancing, and therefore 
motivate a reflective stance.
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1 Introduction
Illness is a profound and life-changing event. Falling ill or receiving a diagnosis of a 
serious illness requires the ill person, and those around her, to stop and take stock of 
life as it has been and as it may be from now on.1 This often leads to a reconsidera-
tion of values and goals, and to a need to renegotiate ways of being that previously 
characterised the ill person’s life. Given the profound impact illness has on one’s 
life and its near-universal nature (we all grow old and die, most often from a disease 
of some sort), illness plays a significant role in human life. Although illness is a 
largely negative and painful experience, it is useful to bear in mind that it can also 
be edifying and the source of personal growth, in ways documented in philosophical, 
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1 I use the term “illness” throughout to denote serious, chronic, or life-changing illness. I exclude from 
this definition transient illness (e.g. flu), or a medical condition that can be fully resolved (e.g. fractured 
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psychological and health economics literature.2 For these reasons, philosophy ought 
to study illness, but also to view illness as a philosophical resource, as I argued pre-
viously.3 The relationship between illness and philosophy is bilateral: philosophy is 
necessary for a full understanding of illness and the study of illness is integral to a 
philosophical investigation of human existence.
On a practical level, illness brings about change and demands adaptation. The 
ill person may be unable to continue working or may need help with daily care, 
for example. This requires readjustment and consideration where once routine and 
habit were sufficient. But there is also considerable change on an existential level, 
where illness is often experienced as a call for reflection. I suggest that illness is not 
only a life event that can be studied by philosophy, but also a forceful invitation to 
philosophise. I use the almost contradictory term “forceful invitation” to express its 
ambivalence. One the one hand, it is an urgent call, a demand for reflection. On the 
other hand, it remains optional. Not all who are invited will, or ought to, respond 
reflectively to illness. I suggest that illness plays an active role as a motivation for, 
or entry gate into, philosophy. The role of illness is not limited to that of a pas-
sive object of phenomenological scrutiny. Rather, I propose that illness, and pathol-
ogy more generally, can be developed into a phenomenological method in their own 
right.
I further propose that the process a person undergoes when they fall ill is, in 
important respects, similar to Husserl’s epoché, or bracketing of the natural attitude. 
The two share important features: They both distance a person from habitual ways 
of being; they both offer open, non-prescriptive ways of experiencing; and they both 
present an alternative to a set of metaphysical assumptions we tacitly make about the 
world.
I claim that studying cases of pathology, breakdown, and illness illuminates not 
only these pathological experiences, but also normal function and the tacit back-
ground that underpins it. In particular, I claim that the study of embodiment can be 
greatly enhanced, and indeed would be incomplete, without examining bodily break-
down and what I term “bodily doubt.” Thus, in these two ways—the distancing that 
illness causes and the insights we may glean from illness experiences—illness offers 
a philosophical method proper.
In what follows, I explain the motivation for this view and outline what a “path-
ological phenomenology” might be like. I suggest that the study of pathology, 
whether of body or of mind, can form the basis of a phenomenological method. 
This is for several reasons. First, illness is a “limit case,” helping to reveal the full 
spectrum of human experience, because it adds extreme or abnormal experiences 
to what we normally experience. Second, illness often gives rise to reflection on 
finitude, dis-ability, suffering, injustice, and other existential themes. It tests conven-
tional views, as well as norms and habits that have tacitly and pre-reflectively guided 
us. Third, illness distances the ill person from previous bodily and life habits and 
their accompanying tacit assumptions. This gives me reason to suggest that illness 
2 Kidd (2012) and Haidt (2006).
3 Carel (2014, 2016b).
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amounts to an entry gate into philosophical reflection and offers a phenomenological 
method in its own right.
A final note on my use of the term pathology: I loosely follow George Canguil-
hem’s distinction in The Normal and the Pathological, between normal states that 
are conducive, “business as usual” states of the organism, which express a harmoni-
ous relationship with the environment, and pathological states, which are states of 
difficulty, aberration, and disharmony.4 I am not suggesting a normative hierarchy 
privileging the normal over the pathological tout court; no such simple hierarchy 
is possible and the value judgements we make about these states are complex and 
context dependent. What I do argue is that there is a profound break between the two 
types of state so pathological states are not merely amplified or quantitatively more 
extreme versions of normal states, but of a different kind altogether and hence wor-
thy of independent and thorough philosophical investigation.
2  Illness as existential change
Illness is a disruptive, painful, frightening experience.5 It often shakes one’s being 
to the core, demanding an immediate response from the ill person and those around 
her. It is a powerful way to reveal the limits of embodied experience, considering the 
extraordinary bodily experiences that illness affords us, for example, when undergo-
ing major surgery, suffering a stroke or cardiac arrest, and of course when dying. 
These experiences may bring the person suffering from them close to the limit of 
human existence and are can thus be called “limit cases”; such experiences often 
exceed our capacities to make sense of them.
These kinds of cases and other experiences of extreme and unusual embodiment 
shed light on normal experience, putting it in a new perspective and opening new 
horizons of bodily experiences as we know them.6 Illness has a powerful capacity 
to shed light on normal experience because it both extends it and contrasts with it. It 
broadens both the bodily and mental spectrum of experience, to include the patho-
logical domain. For example, bodily experiences of sudden paralysis, debilitating 
pain, or losing a sense are all pathological experiences that necessarily broaden the 
spectrum of bodily experience because they are profoundly different to normal expe-
riences and to the experiences which preceded them. The spectrum of mental expe-
riences can also be broadened through pathological experiences, for example, with 
the appearance of voice hearing or visual hallucinations.
Although we usually call illness experiences “pathological” to indicate that they 
lie outside the normal range of experience and are harmful (as opposed to merely 
neutral) dysfunction, they are still an integral part of life, as illness remains a near-
universal event in human life, and thus part of what I have called, with Ian James 
4 Canguilhem (1991).
5 Sontag (1978) and Carel (2018).
6 Carel (2013, 2016b).
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Kidd, “the facts of life.”7 No account of human life, and certainly no account of the 
good human life, is complete without considering illness and pathology as currently 
necessary aspects of human existence.8
In terms of their contrast with normal experience, pathological cases are ones in 
which illness disrupts normal, previously taken for granted, transparent experiences 
of health, and replaces a past set of habits and routines with a newly acquired set of 
responsive adaptations to the illness. Illness can become salient in two ways: it can 
be experienced as a sudden and severe disruption (e.g. in the case of stroke), or it 
can gradually become a form of life (e.g. with the progressive decline of function 
characteristic of some illnesses).9 The important common feature of both processes 
is the disruption of past experiences and habits. In this illness differs from congeni-
tal disability, for example, where there is no disruption of this sort and hence little 
need to adapt, reorient or restore a disrupted life narrative.
But the two processes of becoming ill differ in how the disruption is experienced. 
In the first case, that of sudden illness or accident, the disruption is foreign, threat-
ening, and sudden. It is an abrupt break from previous events which stands in sharp 
contrast to them and thus makes visible the previously largely transparent structure 
of everyday life. In the second type of experience, illness becomes a form of life. It 
“sneaks up on us, or we become so habituated to it that it defines our form of life—
it becomes us, or we become it.”10 As “it becomes us,” our old life form is shed 
and a new form—with illness—becomes the “new normal.” There is a difference 
from past everyday experience, but this change has come about gradually. This is the 
case of, for example, a slow progressive disease that gradually restricts the ill per-
son’s world. Gradual accommodation may mean that the illness is not experienced 
as a dramatic disruption but as a gradual change. These could also be two phases of 
an illness, which may at one time progress slowly and almost imperceptibly and at 
other times cause sudden exacerbation.11
Looking more closely at this view of illness as a “complete form of existence,” 
we can see how a new lifeworld, a restricted, dis-eased one, can replace the pre-
vious lifeworld of health, bodily transparency and “silence of the organs.”12 What 
makes it a new lifeworld are not only practical concerns, but the fundamental fact 
that all of one’s modes of being and doing are affected by illness, for example, by 
changes to motility, energy levels, pain and sensory experience, as well as to mood, 
social world, goals and projects, relationships with others, temporality and so on. 
Illness profoundly alters how we find ourselves in the world, radically modifying the 
embodied basis of the existentiales (in the Heideggerian sense) upon which mean-
ing, sociality, identity, selfhood, autonomy, and consciousness are premised.13 The 
10 (ibid).
11 Paterson (2001).
12 Leriche, cited in Canguilhem (1991). On the transparency of health see Sartre (2003).
13 Heidegger (1962).
7 Carel and Kidd (2019). On harmful dysfunction see Wakefield (1992).
8 cf. Carel (2016b, ch. 6).
9 Gallagher (unpublished presentation).
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foundation upon which a life is built is fractured by illness, and is then sometimes 
replaced by a new foundation from which novel modes of being can be rebuilt, but 
this foundaion can also be destroyed with nothing to replace it.
To illustrate the profound change to the ill person’s world, consider our concepts. 
One’s concepts change with illness. If one now needs to use a wheelchair, the upper 
floors of a building with no lift become inaccessible. But beyond the practical prob-
lem now faced by the person, shared meanings (such as “the common room on the 
top floor”) become disrupted. Terms such as a “short walk” or “round the corner” 
lose their shared meaning and acquire new, idiosyncratic meaning by the ill person, 
who has now moved away from shared meaning not only practically and socially 
but also conceptually: the norms which underpin much human exchange no longer 
include her embodied being in the world.
The ill person’s engagement with the ready-to-hand environment in which they 
find themselves also changes. As Kay Toombs writes, “the bookcase outside my 
bedroom was once intended by my body as a ‘repository for books’ then as ‘that 
which is to be grasped for support on the way to the bathroom,’ and is now intended 
as ‘an obstacle to get around with my wheelchair’.”14 The relationship the ill person 
has with objects, people, space and time, shifts as the illness progresses.
In response, the ill person’s expectations also change. She may expect to do less, 
give up certain activities (e.g. travel, sports) and realign her plans, values and ambi-
tions accordingly. For example, a healthy person would probably not be satisfied 
by a prognosis of 5-year survival, whereas someone with an aggressive cancer may 
consider that an enviable goal. The ill person’s sense of time and value are often 
readjusted. Illness is a comprehensive realignment of meaning, values and ways of 
being.15
This degree of disruption, adjustment or adaptation calls upon the ill person to 
engage reflectively with their life and open themselves to the existential challenge 
of diminished bodily capacity, mental incapacitation, pain, and fear of the future.16 
The engagement can be solely on a practical level, but some illness events, such 
as receiving a poor prognosis, inevitably raise questions about death, meaning, and 
value. These kinds of questions trigger reflection, for example through deep conver-
sations with friends, carers or family.17 Thus, illness can be—although, importantly, 
this is not a prescriptive statement—an invitation to engage critically with existen-
tial questions,18 as Arthur Frank writes:
Critical illness offers the experience of being taken to the threshold of life, 
from which you can see where your life could end. From that vantage point 
you are both forced and allowed to think in new ways about the value of your 
14 Toombs (1995, p. 16).
15 Carel (2016b, 2018).
16 Carel (2018).
17 See, for example, Albom (2003), Ware (2012), and Kalanithi (2016).
18 In addition, illness can also be an opportunity, indeed a demand, to demonstrate virtues such as cour-
age, equanimity and patience. See Carel (2017), Kidd (2012).
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life. Alive, but detached from everyday living, you can finally stop to consider 
why you live as you have […].19
The disruptions and existential demands of illness amount to a powerful distanc-
ing of the ill person from her now-lost healthy life. This distancing can motivate a 
reflective stance and is a forceful invitation to philosophise. As such, the distancing 
triggering this reflective process is a type of what Husserl calls the epoché, to which 
we now turn.
3  Illness as epoché
Illness, I suggest, is an existential change of such magnitude that it amounts to a 
kind of epoché, or bracketing, putting in abeyance our former beliefs about the 
nature of reality. The reflective process triggered by illness can also be thought of 
as a form of phenomenological reduction. The reduction is core to phenomenologi-
cal practice and involves moving our attention from objects to acts of perception, 
focusing on the acts, their meaning, modes of operation and how we experience 
them. Importantly, the reduction does not involve ceasing to perceive, nor is it a 
sceptical stance.20 Rather, it is a shift in a way of being that suspends our natural 
attitude towards perception and the world and enables philosophical reflection. The 
reduction calls on us to suspend our underlying metaphysical beliefs, in favour of a 
neutralization of belief in the existence of the world or of a particular object. The 
reduction brackets our realist assumptions to enable withdrawal from an ordinarily 
implicit commitment to the reality of the world. As Zahavi notes, the reduction’s 
role is not to “deny, doubt, neglect, abandon, or exclude reality from our research, 
but simply to suspend or neutralise a certain dogmatic attitude toward reality.”21 In 
the reduction, under-theorised aspects of experience become an object of enquiry, 
because we shift our attention from a given object to the way in which it is given and 
its modes of appearance to us.
For Husserl, this procedure enables us to bracket the natural attitude, and thus to 
set aside, or suspend, taken-for-granted, meaning-laden, metaphysically determined 
ways of experiencing. Phenomenology is committed to making explicit aspects of 
experience that are overlooked by other approaches and may be poorly understood. 
An adequate approach to the experience of illness requires a phenomenological 
reduction: a suspension of a natural attitude of implicitly accepting the background 
sense of belonging to a world and various interpretive dogmas along with it. Brack-
eting the natural attitude is a withdrawal from the ordinarily implicit commitment to 
the reality of the world, which allows us to see the world as a phenomenon of being, 
instead of something that is.22
22 Ratcliffe (2008, p. 4).
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In order to reflect in this way, one needs to dislodge everyday habits and familiar 
modes of experience. Again, this is not a removal from the world but a shift to a way 
of being in the world that enables reflection. The shift moves us from the natural to 
the critical attitude, in which one can examine their relationship to the world in acts 
of perception in a new light. As Husserl writes, this “Inhibiting” or “putting out of 
play” of the natural attitude exposes “my pure living [...] the universe of phenom-
ena.”23 Zahavi characterises the reduction as an “entry gate” to reflection.24 In the 
next section I suggest that the reduction, and illness, are such an entry gate to reflec-
tion. But first, I would like to draw out the commonalities between the reduction and 
the distancing caused by illness.
There are several ways of thinking about the relationship between the epoché and 
illness. We should consider disability, as well as the two forms of illness, sudden 
and gradual, discussed earlier. We also need to distinguish congenital from acquired 
disability. There may be considerable overlap between the different categories, so 
it is worth reminding the reader that I use the term illness here to denote a serious 
health condition that may be chronic and is not fully reversible. There is much to 
say about the different categories and how this definition would relate to each, but it 
will suffice to suggest a rough definition: I wish to pick out the group of conditions 
that amount to a serious and irreversible health condition, which may be caused 
by disease but may also be caused by trauma, e.g. an accident. The irreversibility 
is important, as full recovery enables a return, so to speak, to the natural attitude, 
whilst remaining ill requires developing an alternative attitude, as a return to the pre-
reflective attitude is not possible.
Illness is bracketed by refusing to see it solely as a physiological process, the 
object of biomedical enquiry.25 The shift is to viewing illness as an experience, 
which may or may not be linked to physiological dysfunction (for example, in 
some cases of mental illness, such as personality disorders there is no such known 
link). When we bracket in this way, we resist the common contemporary (West-
ern) understanding that the disease (biological dysfunction) is the correct object of 
investigation, and instead turn our attention to the illness (the experience of feeling 
“dis-ease”). This enables us to decouple the illness experience from a biomedical 
framework, social scripts and the “sick role,” which are common ways in which ill-
ness is reduced to disease while alternative interpretations of it may be suppressed 
to the point that they are eradicated.26
Resisting reductive dominant perspectives, which posit the illness experience as 
derivative from other, more primary, entities or processes, is an important kind of 
resistance phenomenology offers. Resisting the impulse to categorise, define, and 
reduce experience is a major task of phenomenology. In the case of illness, phe-
nomenology can serve as an antidote for some kinds of hermeneutical injustice, a 
23 Husserl (1960, p. 20).
24 Zahavi (2003), cf. Carel (2014).
25 Carel (2012).
26 Kidd and Carel (2018).
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concept coined by Miranda Fricker.27 Hermeneutical injustice is one kind of epis-
temic injustice, which is caused by epistemic marginalisation in which only the dom-
inant interpretation of the experience, in this case the biomedical view, is accepted 
as accurate, true, and fully representative of the reality of illness.28 Hermeneutical 
injustice arises from a lack in interpretative resources that would enable an alterna-
tive understanding of an experience, in this case the experience of illness. As long 
as patients simply mimic the medical jargon and manner of speaking about their ill-
ness, no alternative interpretation can emerge. But if ill persons insist on developing 
their own interpretation and resisting the pre-determined given ones (e.g. resisting 
the biomedical view of one’s illness as reducible to disease), it can be experienced 
and articulated idiosyncratically, personally, subjectively, and non-reductively.29
The phenomenological patient toolkit provides patients with tools for cultivat-
ing alternative, non-dominant interpretations of their illness experience.30 It is also 
designed to help patients move away from the natural attitude towards illness. The 
toolkit provides a non-judgemental, supportive, and open context in which its three 
steps can help ill persons make their own sense of their experience of illness, using 
phenomenology. Bracketing the natural attitude toward illness suspends the belief in 
the reality of an objective disease entity. This suspension does not deny the objec-
tive reality of disease processes; but shifting the focus away from the disease entity 
and toward one’s own experience of it can disclose new features of this experience, 
as well as giving ownership over the illness experience and the ensuing process of 
sense-making.
We usually take the disease entity for granted and posit it as the source of the 
illness experience. But, in fact, for the ill person the illness experience often comes 
before (both temporally and in terms of its importance) the objective disease entity 
and in some cases (e.g. medically unexplained symptoms, some mental disorder) 
is never anchored in any known  disease entity.31 Once the belief in the objective 
disease entity is bracketed and we are distanced from our usual way of experienc-
ing, we can begin to explore how illness appears to the ill person, and what are its 
structure and features.
This bracketing is the first step in the phenomenological toolkit. The toolkit uses 
bracketing to develop a new understanding of an illness phenomenon and how it can 
help resist pre-given interpretations of the illness experience. This bracketing of the 
natural attitude is analogous to Husserl’s epoché, so illness both triggers the epoché 
but can also be interpreted by it.
I suggest that illness forces a kind of epoché on the ill person. What one ordi-
narily takes for granted becomes salient when it is lost or changed through illness. 
Illness involves a phenomenological reduction because it compels us to suspend 
27 Fricker (2007).
28 Kidd and Carel (2016a, b, 2018).
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“our normal, taken for granted way of approaching the world.”32 This is particularly 
so in the case of mental illness, which involves changes to the natural attitude and 
therefore requires a methodological shift to understand it.33 These phenomenologi-
cal insights can help ill persons engage in an unrestricted fashion with their illness. 
The epoché can pave the way to exploring the unique significance illness has for a 
particular individual, within a particular context and situation.
The second step in the toolkit is thematising illness. “Thematising” refers to the 
act of attending to a phenomenon, which makes aspects of it explicit.34 A theme for 
a particular consciousness is that upon which it focuses its attention. This does not 
simply denote the intentional object; it also takes into account the kind of attentional 
focus on an entity. Thematising may include attending to the cognitive, emotive, 
moral, or aesthetic aspects of a phenomenon. A patient may thematise her illness 
as a central feature of her life, attending to her symptoms as pervasive, while the 
physician may thematise the illness as a “case of cancer,” attending to symptoms as 
diagnostic clues.35 The understanding that illness is not an objective entity and the 
exercise of thematizing may help patients because it enables moving away from pre-
scriptive pronouncements toward a descriptive mode.
Thematising can be used for bringing out the multiple perspectives on one’s ill-
ness that patient, family, health professionals, and others may have, as each will the-
matise an illness differently. The patient may thematise her illness emotively, while 
a health professional will thematise it cognitively. A family member may thematize 
illness as an experience of empathy. Thematising is useful for uncovering the vari-
ety of ways of appearing illness has. Exploring the different thematic centres illness 
may have can illuminate its multiple ways of appearing. By thematising different 
aspects of illness as a social phenomenon, as a source of pain, as a trigger of innova-
tion, and so on, the multidimensionality of illness can be revealed. Thematising cre-
ates a complex, shifting, view of illness as moving from foreground to background, 
as changing in meaning, and as consisting of multiple perspectives. Also, the theme 
of one’s particular concern is presented against a background, the horizons in which 
it appears.36 Understanding the figure–background relationship helps to see illness 
as part of a broader context, and illness horizons that are more productive can be 
explored.
The third step of the toolkit is to take the new understanding of illness (as a dis-
tancing that has been thematized) and examine how it changes one’s being-in-the-
world. The main components of being-in-the-world, for Heidegger, are being-in 
(inhabiting or dwelling in a place), the world (the meaningful network of entities, 
practices, and meanings that make up our world), and being, which is the open exist-
ence of humans, capable of temporal existence and understanding.37 The toolkit uses 
34 Toombs (1987, p. 222).
35 (ibid.).
36 Drummond (2007, p. 201).
37 Heidegger (1962).
32 Moran (2000, p. 144).
33 Ratcliffe (2008, p. 7).
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being-in-the-world to capture the pervasive effects illness may have on one’s sense 
of place, interactions with the environment and with other people, on meanings and 
norms, and on the nexus of entities, habits, knowledge, and other people that makes 
up one’s world. This term enables us to elaborate on the impact of illness richly 
and comprehensively. By moving away from a narrow understanding of illness as a 
biological process, ill persons can develop a thick account of illness as a new way of 
being-in-the-world. Because illness turns from being an external intrusion to being 
a form of existence, the notion of being in the world is particularly apposite; it helps 
us understand the pervasive impact illness may have on all life domains, which are 
interconnected, as captured by the term “being in the world.”
The patient toolkit is a practical exercise of the epoché, and a theoretical means of 
demonstrating the analogy between illness and the epoché. The reduction, which is 
a key tool in phenomenological work, as well as other tools, such as thematising, are 
not just useful tools for illuminating the experience of illness. This illumination is 
also a form of resistance, eschewing external understandings of illness foisted upon 
the ill person. The toolkit opens a space within which an idiosyncratic and individ-
ual interpretation can be developed independently of any pre-given interpretations, 
such as social scripts and biomedical interpretations. Such resistance is important 
not just politically, in terms of patient autonomy and patient rights, for example, but 
also philosophically, because it demonstrates the power of illness to generate reflec-
tion. In this illness is a sister process to the epoché. The dual role of illness, as philo-
sophical trigger and as prime candidate for philosophical attention, is also evidenced 
in the kind of personal crisis that often accompanies falling ill, to which I now turn.
4  Illness, crisis of meaning, and reflection
The process described in the previous section affirms the analogy between illness 
and the epoché as both powerful and useful. Illness, like the epoché, strips away 
shared meanings (bracketing, or the first step of the toolkit), and in doing that sheds 
new light on ordinarily tacit aspects of existence. I now want to continue developing 
this account by looking at illness as a crisis of meaning. Illness can be a life crisis, 
especially if the diagnosis or symptom appearance are sudden. It is characterised by 
disruption, detachment from the everyday, and can amount to a collapse of the ill 
person’s narrative. This collapse can initiate deep anxiety, which Heidegger charac-
terises as a loss of meaning, in which possibilities for action become levelled as they 
lose their salience and make one unable to choose between them. One can then fall 
into a state of paralysis, unable to act, because unable to choose a course of action, 
as all options have been levelled. In this state action is paralysed but existence is 
experienced at its most acute, as Heidegger describes in Being and Time.38 Illness 
can operate similarly to Heidegger’s state of anxiety, paralysing the structures and 
habits of everyday life that served until now to scaffold one’s actions. Both Husserl’s 
38 Heidegger (1962).
1 3
Pathology as a phenomenological tool 
epoché and Heideggerian anxiety are stances in which significant experiences give 
rise to reflection. I suggest that the experiences illness, the epoché, and anxiety share 
are all reflective, or even hyper-reflective, forms of engagement with the world.
The case of illness is particularly interesting because reflection is a demand 
placed upon the ill person, who is compelled to re-examine and change her life. 
Illness is a violent event, an encounter which destabilises the structures of experi-
ence. Illness reveals our being by pushing it to its limits, to finitude, dis-ability, and 
alienation which are extreme modes of being. Illness may be even more radical than 
the epoché because it is imposed upon the ill person with no invitation, often little 
preparation, and little to protect oneself from its impact.
I now want to offer a view of illness that goes beyond this catastrophic and 
destructive picture, and suggest that, without denying the hardship and adversity of 
illness, it can also be a way into philosophy. Because it is a radical displacement of 
the natural attitude which problematises one’s relationship to one’s world, illness 
can lead to critical philosophical reflection. It does not necessarily do so and indeed, 
people who are ill may be too engaged with their personal struggle to want or be 
able to reflect. But illness gives rise to disruption, change and challenge in ways that 
amount to an existential jolt that may lead people to philosophise.
For example, illness is often said to lead to objectification. In this process, there 
is a growing distance between self and body, which is reified by medical inquiry and 
treatment. Illness breaks down the natural attitude towards the now-ill body and dis-
rupts the unity between the body as object and the body as subject, as well as mak-
ing objectification replace the habitual body. Jean-Dominique Bauby writes in his 
moving account of his stroke which left him with locked-in syndrome, The Diving 
Bell and the Butterfly:
Reflected in the glass I saw the head of a man who seemed to have emerged 
from a vat of formaldehyde. His mouth was twisted, his nose damaged, his hair 
tousled, his gaze full of fear. One eye was sewn shut, the other goggled like 
that doomed eye of Cain. For a moment I stared at that dilated pupil before I 
realised it was only mine.39
Illness can often also lead to a feeling of uncanniness. The ill body is a source 
of negative experiences, so that the body becomes an obstacle and threat. The per-
spicuous nature of bodily orientation becomes occluded with negative attention. The 
Husserlian attitude of practical ability, the sense of “I can” is replaced by “I can-
not,” an attitude of helplessness, resignation, dis-ability. And these experiences can 
lead to what Fredrik Svenaeus calls “unhomelike being in the world.”40 It is not just 
new experiences that give rise to these feelings of objectification and uncanniness. 
Illness can, more radically, change the structure of experience by modifying the 
experience of space and time, as we see happening to time consciousness in depres-
sion.41 Objectification and uncanniness can also invite reflection, because they are 
39 Bauby (2007, pp. 32–33).




so different to previous experience: they consist of a rift from past ways of being 
embodied.
Illness is an invitation to a unique form of reflection. Whereas we usually think 
of reflection as volitional and theoretical, in this case it arrives through illness, unin-
vited and threatening, causing anxiety and uncertainty. Illness is a radical, violent 
philosophical motivation which may also be more radical, more intimate, and more 
authentic than theoretical entry gates, such as the epoché. It is more intimate because 
it ensues from one’s experiences of one’s own body or mind changing abruptly and 
radically. As such it calls for a more radical or personal method of philosophising, 
through a phenomenological method. The radical nature of this invitation can also 
be used to sharpen and expand philosophical enquiry. Illness as philosophical invi-
tation can affect the ill person’s philosophical concerns, as well as lending urgency 
and salience to the philosophising it motivates.
5  Pathology illuminating normalcy
Illness deepens our understanding of embodied living by illuminating normal pat-
terns of motility, comportment, and spatiality through their aberration. Merleau-
Ponty uses this methodology when he examines pathological cases, such as phan-
tom limb, anosognosia, and aphasia, to illuminate normalcy as full and spontaneous 
engagement with the world.42 This methodology has been criticized as creating a 
false dichotomy between normalcy and pathology and as conflating natural and nor-
mal function.43 However, it is undeniable that illness raises philosophical questions 
about embodied existence, the mind–body relationship, value and meaning of life, 
death and finitude, and human vulnerability. As a juncture of such central philo-
sophical issues, it deserves systematic philosophical exploration not just of these 
issues and themes, but also of its process, structure and edifying capacity.44 Illness 
is a pragmatic disruption of lived experience, not an academic, studied phenomeno-
logical reduction but a lived experience that motivates such a reduction. As such it 
is phenomenology in action. However, the contribution illness can make to phenom-
enology, and philosophy more generally, has been overlooked.
Pathological states of embodiment enable us to see the full range of human expe-
rience (as discussed in Sect.  2) as well as the contrast between normal embodied 
experience and its aberration.45 Pathological instances shed light on normalcy by 
contrasting with taken-for-granted normal situations, perceptual and motor pro-
cesses, and modes of being. This accords such states a productive epistemic role in, 
for example, phenomenology, philosophy of perception, epistemology and philoso-
phy of action. The reliance of much philosophical argument on normal embodiment, 
42 Merleau-Ponty (1964, 2012).
43 Dorfman (2005).
44 cf. Kidd (2012).
45 Carel (2016b).
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which is a common tacit assumption in many contemporary discussions, can lead to 
a narrowing of possibilities of thought and a restricted consideration of what human 
life is and can be. Looking to expand this menu is an important task, one that only 
now is beginning to be undertaken by a variety of authors.46
Cases of pathology, e.g. neuropathology, demonstrate to us that normal per-
ception is not something taken for granted but an achievement. Merleau-Ponty’s 
well-known analysis of Schneider, for example, illustrates that. Merleau-Ponty 
characterises Schneider’s malaise as existential, as modifying his entire existence. 
“[Schneider] is ‘bound’ to the actual, and he ‘lacks freedom,’ he lacks the concrete 
freedom that consists in the general power of placing oneself in a situation.”47
Merleau-Ponty uses Schneider’s peculiar pathology to reveal how our bodies are 
“the power for a certain world.”48 The normal person, Merleau-Ponty says, “reck-
ons with the possible,” which thus acquires a certain actuality.49 In pathological 
cases the field of actuality is limited—much of what was possible is now off-limits. 
What was effortless and taken for granted is now a conscious, explicit effort; it is 
this effort and the correlating achievement of action that make pathological cases 
illuminating, because this effort illuminates for the first time taken for granted ways 
of being.50 By making explicit what normally goes unnoticed, such cases draw our 
attention to how things normally are.
Merleau-Ponty’s interpretation of Schneider’s case can be formulated in a more 
general form as the breakdown of the intentional arc:
[…] the life of consciousness – epistemic life, the life of desire, or percep-
tual life – is underpinned by an “intentional arc” that projects around us our 
past, our future, our human milieu, our physical situation, our ideological situ-
ation, and our moral situation […]. This intentional arc creates the unity of the 
senses, the unity of the senses with intelligence, and the unity of sensitivity 
and motricity. And this is what “goes limp” in the disorder.51
This breakdown of normal human existence, which can happen in a vast range 
of somatic and mental disorders, merits philosophical study in its own right.52 But 
it also provides a unique opportunity to reveal facets of normal existence that are 
usually invisible. Pathological cases can make explicit the intricate life of embodied 
consciousness which gives rise to everyday experience.53
52 Carel (2016a, b).
53 Another well-known case is that of Ian Waterman, who suffered from de-efferentation (loss of the 
motor nerve fibres) from the neck down (Gallagher 2005). Waterman learned to use vision to locate his 
limbs and identify his posture. Gallagher uses this case to provide a philosophical account of propriocep-
tion.
46 See, for example, Harcourt’s (2016) and Carel’s (2016a, 2017) attempt to do this for virtues; Barnes 
(2016) bringing the minority body into philosophical mainstream; Stone’s (2019) attention to natality; 
Leder’s focus on the distressed body (2016); and Slatman’s (2014) Our Strange Body.
47 Merleau-Ponty (2012, p. 137).
48 (ibid., p. 109). It was thought that Schneider’s pathology was vision agnosia, but recently Marotta and 
Behrmann (2004) have argued that his was a case of integrative agnosia.
49 (ibid., p. 112).
50 Gallagher (2005).
51 Merleau-Ponty (2012, p. 137).
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I now turn to a somatic case which will be less familiar. This example is the study 
of pathological breathlessness, undertaken in the Life of Breath project, a research 
project led by the author and Jane Macnaughton.54 Studying breathlessness that 
is caused by clinically subnormal respiratory or cardiac function can reveal tacit 
aspects of the normal sensation of breathlessness, experienced when healthy peo-
ple exercise, for example.55 Pathological breathlessness reveals the extent to which 
natural breath modulation supports everyday action, how the brain produces the sen-
sation of breathlessness using environmental cues and past experiences, and how 
restricting breath has an immediate and powerful impact on one’s emotional state.56
Empirical studies of the sensation of breathlessness reported by respiratory 
patients describe it as threatening, limiting, and unpleasant, giving rise to a feeling 
of loss of control and to profound suffering.57 This can make explicit the feelings 
associated with normal breathlessness experienced by healthy people on exertion, 
e.g. when dancing or playing a sport. Normal breathlessness contrasts sharply with 
pathological breathlessness: it is benign, can be enjoyable, and is not threatening or 
uncontrolled. It goes largely unnoticed and therefore does not call upon the person 
experiencing it to reflect, whereas pathological breathlessness does.
Other dimensions of pathological breathlessness also illuminate normal breath-
ing. Panic attacks, in which people feel unable to breathe, or feel they are suffo-
cating, reveal the normal sensation of bodily certainty that underpins each breath. 
Doubting our breath, or any other bodily function, unravels our bodily certainty, 
resulting in loss of continuity, loss of transparency of the body, and loss of faith in 
one’s body.58
Looking at this stanza by Rilke, we can see how significant, yet tacit, rhythmic 
breathing is to our experience:
Breath, you invisible poem---
pure exchange, sister to silence,
being and its counterbalance,
rhythm wherein I become.59
Breath is invisible, and akin to silence, but is nonetheless the source of the bal-
ance and rhythm of becoming. It is only when breath is disrupted that the normal 
way of things—the rhythm it provides, the “pure exchange” it continually facili-
tates—comes to our notice. Breathing and its pathological counterpart, breathless-
ness, are mutually implicated and mutually illuminating. Herein lies the usefulness 
of pathology: we need to study the pathological in order to bring to light normal and 
hence largely overlooked experiences. To understand what a certain brain area does, 
we study stroke victims with damage in the relevant area. To understand the impor-
tance of early years nurturing, we study its deprivation. To study breath, we look at 
54 The Life of Breath project (2014–2020), funded by the Wellcome Trust, studied the experience of 
breathing and breathlessness. See www.lifeo fbrea th.org.
55 Carel, Macnaughton and Dodd (2015).
56 (ibid.), Faull et al. (2017), and Williams and Carel (2017).
57 Abernethy and Wheeler (2008).
58 Carel (2013).
59 Rainer Maria Rilke, Sonnets to Orpheus, Book II.
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breathlessness. In this way, the pathological can illuminate the normal, by making 
the invisible visible.
Merleau-Ponty writes: “[reflection] loosens the intentional threads that connect 
us to the world in order to make them appear; it alone is conscious of the world 
because it reveals the world as strange and paradoxical.”60 With these examples in 
mind, I suggest that illness, and pathology more generally, enact such a loosening of 
the intentional threads. Such enactment makes evident one’s complex, yet seemingly 
unremarkable—and therefore unremarked upon—relationship to the world.
I end on a speculative note. Might there be a useful analogy between cases of 
bodily or somatic pathology, such as the ones described above, and philosophical 
thought experiments? Are thought experiments examples of pathology within phi-
losophy, and do they thus illuminate the normal form arguments and intuitions take? 
Can we think of established thought experiments—brain in a vat, the land of fake 
barns, some forms of scepticism—as ones that similarly distance us from habit-
ual modes of reflection, away from the natural attitude, in favour of a more criti-
cal engagement with ideas that remove them from their sedimented, already-given 
meaning? Such dislodging, disruption and distancing are core to philosophical work 
and, I suggest, share the very same distancing force that is at work in illness and the 
epoché. The study of pathology in this wider sense is a new and prima facie merited 
form of phenomenological work, which I hope to further develop into a fuller form 
in future work.
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